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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Just past midnight, four Cubans walked off the beach in the dark and 
began to wade through warm waves out into the Florida Straits.
1
 They 
walked nearly a mile in waist-high water, carrying all of their possessions 
above their heads. They knew to stop when they heard the mile-marker 
bobbing in the water. Fidgeting and nervous, they waited there for hours 
afraid that they would be discovered by Cuban patrols or sharks. Finally, 
they could see the navigational lights of a fast-boat approaching. Twenty-
nine other refugees were already aboard the boat and shifted to make room 
for them. Together, they lay huddled on the deck, praying that the vessel 
would go undetected by the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard).  
 The successful smuggling expedition ended shortly after dawn, when 
the passengers walked ashore onto a Key Largo, Florida beach.
2
 The group 
immediately sought out an immigration official and identified themselves 
as Cuban nationals. After receiving a meal and undergoing inspection 
according to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, the refugees were 
paroled
3
 into the United States by the end of the day. If the refugees were 
of any other nationality, or had in fact been interdicted at sea by the Coast 
Guard, they would have been repatriated immediately.  
 More appealing than the fabled sirens‘ song, the Cuban Adjustment 
Act (CAA) continues to call Cubans out to sea with the promise of ―no 
questions asked‖ political asylum for those who reach the United States. In 
1994, the CAA was modified by the counter-intuitive ―Wet Foot/Dry Foot‖ 
policy, which reserves the preferential protections of the CAA for only 
those ―dry foot‖ Cubans who reach United States soil. In contrast, the 
Coast Guard repatriates ―wet foot‖ Cubans discovered at sea. Because 
those interdicted at sea are generally no less deserving of the safeguard of 
the CAA than those arriving undetected on shore, the Wet Foot/Dry Foot 
policy is essentially a tool to circumvent the automatic award of asylum 
under the CAA. Worse still, the policy incites smuggling by rewarding 
those who are able to evade the Coast Guard and make landfall but 
repatriating those discovered in transit. In addition to incentivizing 
smuggling, the contradiction of the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy 
creates both actus reus and mens rea defenses to the crime of smuggling a 
Cuban national. Notwithstanding immigration issues, the CAA creates a 
national security loophole, whereby terrorists might enter into and remain 
in the United States.  
                                                                                                                     
 1. This scenario is based on the story of Cuban refugee Miakiel Gonzalez, as reported on 
HavanaTimes.org. Kelly Knaub, The Cuban Adjustment Act 44 Years Later, HAVANA TIMES, May 
15, 2010, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=24150.  
 2. In the article, Gonzalez indicates that he was first taken to Mexico and then walked across 
the United States-Mexico border. Id. However, many cases demonstrate that the Florida Keys are a 
more typical smuggling destination. See United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 620 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (Loggerhead Key, Florida); United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(southwestern Miami-Dade County, Florida); United States v. Zaldivar, 615 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (Key Largo, Florida).  
 3. For a description of the parole function, see discussion infra Part III.A. 
2
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 This Note analyzes the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy and 
assesses whether the justifications for enactment support the continuation 
of the policies today. Part II describes the history of United States-Cuban 
relations. Part III traces the evolution of United States-Cuban migration 
policy, including the enactment of the CAA and the signing of the 1994 
Joint Communiqué, which gave rise to the current Wet Foot/Dry Foot 
policy. Part IV details how these policies incentivize smuggling. Part V 
demonstrates how together these policies create defenses to the crime of 
smuggling a Cuban citizen and examines whether Congress intended for 
such a result in drafting the smuggling statute. Part VI recounts the 
historical justifications for the CAA and considers whether these 
justifications have any place in modern United States-Cuban policy. 
Finding that the historical justifications do not outweigh the smuggling and 
national security issues created by the CAA, Part VII advocates for the 
repeal of the Act. This Note concludes that the CAA is no longer utilitarian 
and should be repealed in favor of a more pragmatic approach wherein 
Cubans migrate only through proper immigration channels.
4
 
II.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT: U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS  
 The relationship between Cuba and the United States spans just over 
one hundred years. In 1898, American soldiers liberated Cuba from 
Spanish colonialism.
5
 For the next four years, the United States military 
continued to occupy Cuba.
6
 In 1903, the United States acquired the 
infamous Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
7
 The perpetual military presence 
on the island made it easy for the United States to meddle in Cuban 
politics, invading Cuba in the years 1906–1909, 1912, and 1917–1923.8 It 
was with the blessing of the American government that Fulgencio Batista 
seized power in 1933.
9
 Batista won the Cuban presidency in 1940 and 
ruled until 1958, years which many Cubans consider a period of Cuban 
―democracy.‖10 Then, in 1959, there was revolution. Fidel Castro ousted 
Batista, bringing communism to Cuba.
11
  
 It was Cuba‘s wealthy who first abandoned the new communist state.12 
Between 1959 and 1962, an estimated 248,070 Cubans fled the country.
13
 
The majority of these refugees were well-educated citizens, many of them 
                                                                                                                     
 4. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).  
 5. REESE ERLICH, DATELINE HAVANA: THE REAL STORY OF U.S. POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF 
CUBA 17 (2009).  
 6. Id. at 17.  
 7. Maria E. Sartori, The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United States’ 
Policy of Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 319, 326–27 
(2001).  
 8. ERLICH, supra note 5, at 19.  
 9. Id. at 19–20.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 20–21.  
 12. MARÍA CRISTINA GARCÍA, HAVANA USA 13 (1996). 
 13. Id.  
3
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doctors, lawyers, and professors.
14
 Their exodus resulted in a ―brain drain‖ 
on the Cuban workforce. 
 Shortly thereafter, rumors began to circulate the island that the new 
government intended to ―nationalize‖ school children by sending them to 
the Soviet Union for ―communist indoctrination.‖15 Frantic Cuban parents 
unable to obtain exit visas placed their children on commercial flights from 
Havana to Miami through ―Operation Pedro Pan,‖ ultimately sending 
14,048 Cuban children stateside.
16
 The second great influx of immigrants 
occurred from 1962 to 1965, when many of those children‘s families were 
able to join them in the United States.
17
 
 Desperate to prevent the spread of communism throughout the Western 
hemisphere, the United States government developed a policy to aid anti-
Castro guerilla forces.
18
 In 1960, the CIA began recruiting and training 
Cuban exiles to overthrow the Cuban government.
19
 One year later, the 
trained refugees invaded southern Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in a covert 
American-supported operation.
20
 The would-be heroes were defeated two 
days later.
21
 It was a victory for communism, but a narrow one. The 
Soviets acted quickly to bolster Cuba by sending military artillery, 
including nuclear missiles.
22
 
Fearing the nuclear threat, the Kennedy Administration suspended all 
flights to and from Cuba.
23
 Castro retaliated in a speech on September 29, 
                                                                                                                     
 14. More than two-thirds of the University of Havana faculty immigrated to Miami by 1961. 
Id. at 28. The influx of lawyers was such that, in 1973, the University of Florida designed an 
eighteen-month program that enabled Cuban attorneys to graduate expeditiously with an American 
law degree. Id. 
 15. Yvonne A. Tamayo, Cubans Without Borders: Finding Home, 55 FLA. L. REV. 215, 221 
(2003).  
 16. Id. 
 17. An estimated 74,000 Cubans entered the United States from 1962 to 1965. Roland 
Estevez, Note, Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and Helms-Burton: 
Adding Insult to Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2002). For an account of ―Operation 
Pedro Pan‖ by one who traveled to the United States as part of the program, see generally Francisco 
Valdes, Diaspora and Deadlock, Miami and Havana: Coming to Terms with Dreams and Dogmas, 
55 FLA. L. REV. 283, 284–85 (2003) (recounting his travel from Cuba to an orphanage in Pueblo, 
Colorado and eventual reunion with his family in Miami).  
 18. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 30–31.  
 19. Id. (―The CIA recruited close to fifteen hundred exiles to take part in the invasion force—
or Brigade 2506, as the regiment came to be known—and over the next year trained these men at 
secret bases in Panama, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.‖). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. For a more detailed account of the ―fiasco‖ at the Bay of Pigs, see generally id. at 30–
35.  
 22. Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: ¿Mirando por los Ojos de Don Quijote o 
Sancho Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 903–04 (2001).  
 23. Id. at 904. Though the general ban on travel to Cuba is still in force, President Barack 
Obama lifted the ban on family travel into Cuba in 2009. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS 27 (2010), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40193.pdf. There are now ―no limitations on the frequency or 
duration of family visits.‖ Id. President Obama is expected to make travel even less restrictive in the 
4
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1965, by announcing to Cuban citizens with relatives in the United States 
that their American relatives were free to retrieve them from the shores of 
Cuba without penalty.
24
 That October, a flotilla from Miami descended 
upon Cuba to carry hordes of new immigrants to the United States.
25
 
Within months, the number of Cuban exiles residing in the United States 
nearly doubled from 211,000 to 411,000.
26
 At first, the United States coped 
sufficiently with the influx of refugees.
27
 But when the boatlift gained 
momentum, the administration realized the need for an orderly 
immigration procedure. By November of 1965, Cuban and American 
officials settled on United States funded air transportation for Cuban 
citizens immigrating to Florida.
28
 These ―freedom flights‖ carried almost 
300,000 Cubans to Miami in what is still the ―largest airborne refugee 
operation in American history.‖29 In response to the prolific number of 
Cubans coming over in the ―lifts,‖ Congress enacted the CAA in 1966.30 
Over time, the preferential CAA would become the albatross of U.S.-
                                                                                                                     
near future. Id. 
 24. During the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution at the Plaza de la Revolución, Castro addressed the crowd, using the occasion to ―laugh 
a little at [his] enemies‖:  
[T]he imperialists are making a campaign with those who go, when it is they who 
close all the ways. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . . It is said that we machinegun those that want to go and that we do horrible 
things against them. Well, we must put an end to this once and for all. How? Well, 
we think that there is a good method. It is not we who are opposed to the departure 
of those who want to go, but the imperialists, and since this is the fact, we are even 
ready to fix up a little place somewhere so that all who have relatives here will not 
have to run any risks, will not have to expose their relatives to any kind of risk.  
Premier Fidel Castro, Live Speech at Ceremonies Marking Fifth Anniversary of the CDR (Sept. 29, 
1965) (transcript available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1965/19650929.html).  
 25. Note, supra note 22, at 904.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. In a speech on October 3, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared, ―[T]o the 
people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here in America will find it. . . . [W]e Americans will 
welcome these Cuban people.‖ President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the 
Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York (Oct. 3, 1965), available at 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/651003.asp. President Johnson 
used the Attorney General‘s parole authority, designed to allow for temporary admission of aliens, 
to allow the Cubans immediate legal entry into the United States. See Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical 
Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 870–71 (1982).  
 28. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 38. 
 29. Note, supra note 22, at 905 & n.22. By the time Castro finally ended the freedom flights 
in April 1973, ―3,048 flights had carried 297,318 refugees to the United States.‖ GARCÍA, supra 
note 12, at 43.  
 30. Note, supra note 22, at 905. 
5
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Cuban policy. 
III.  EVOLUTION OF CUBAN-AMERICAN MIGRATION POLICY 
 Under the United States Constitution, Congress enjoys plenary 
authority to establish and enforce immigration policy.
31
 With this authority, 
Congress provides refugees with two options to establish permanent 
residence in the United States: refugee programs in the applicants‘ home 
countries or political asylum once inside the United States.
32
 Refugee 
programs are conducted entirely overseas, with the applicant submitting a 
petition for admission that demonstrates a ―‗well-founded fear of 
persecution.‘‖33 If the petition is approved, the applicant ―may enter the 
United States through one of the admission slots set aside for refugees 
from [their] region of the world.‖34 For example, the United States has 
promised to accept at least 20,000 Cuban immigrants per year through 
legal immigration channels.
35
  
 Refugees already present in the United States may file an application 
for political asylum to prevent deportation but must likewise show a ―well-
founded fear of persecution.‖36 However, as one article points out, that 
claim is extremely difficult to demonstrate, and applicants are successful 
only 15%–30% of the time.37 But there is a loophole for Cubans. The 
protection of the CAA allows Cuban nationals to remain in the United 
States without applying for political asylum, a ―preferential treatment‖ not 
afforded to any other nationality.
38
  
A.  The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 
The CAA originated as a coping mechanism for the inordinate influx of 
Cuban immigrants in the 1960s. Prior to 1966, the majority of Cubans who 
entered the United States came without virtue of visas, background checks, 
or employment authorizations.
39
 Once within the United States, the process 
of obtaining an immigrant visa became a near impossible feat.
40
 Cubans 
seeking permanent United States residency, like all other nationalities, 
were required to leave the United States and apply for an immigration visa 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 32. Id. at 905–06.  
 33. Id. at 906 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) 
(2006)). 
 34. Id.; see also U.S.-Cuba Joint Communiqué on Migration, Sept. 9, 1994, 35 I.L.M. 327, 
330 [hereinafter Joint Communiqué] (indicating the number of spots allocated for Cuban 
immigrants).  
 35. Joint Communiqué, supra note 34, at 330.  
 36. Note, supra note 22, at 906.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 906–07.  
 39. John Scanlan & Gilburt Loescher, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on Refugee 
Flow from Cuba, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 118 (1983).  
 40. Javier Talamo, Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act: A Law Under Siege?, 8 ILSA J. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. 707, 709–10 (2002).  
6
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at a United States consulate.
41
 Only after obtaining the immigrant visa 
could a Cuban return to the United States as a permanent resident, able to 
legally work and enroll in school.
42
 Congress, at least with respect to 
Cuban immigrants, found this process unjust because it created a ―great 
personal hardship to, and impose[d] financial burdens upon, people who 
are already impoverished by force or circumstances.‖43 
In an effort to hasten the resettlement of the ever increasing, 
unemployable Cuban population, Congress drafted the Cuban Refugee Act, 
later called the Cuban Adjustment Act.
44
 The CAA essentially alters 
immigration practice and procedure for Cubans alone. Typically, an alien
45
 
who enters the United States without being inspected and admitted or 
paroled
46
 by an immigration officer
47
 and who is later discovered is subject 
to immediate removal or detention pending formal removal proceedings.
48
  
Parole is intended as a ―temporary, unofficial entry into the United 
States pending the resolution of [an] application[].‖49 However, parole for 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at 709 (citing H.R. REP. 89-1978, at 3793–94 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3792). 
 42. Id. at 709–10.  
 43. H.R. REP. 89-1978, at 3798 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792. 
 44. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255n (2006)). The Act was amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 
1976. Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 9, 90 Stat. 2703, 2707 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 
(2006)). 
 45.  ―Alien‖ is defined as ―any person not a citizen or national of the United States.‖ 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(3) (2006). 
 46. Rather than instituting removal proceedings, the Attorney General may:  
[I]n his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions 
as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons 
or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, 
but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and 
when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, 
have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody 
from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with 
in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United 
States.  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006). For a fuller discussion of parole and adjustment of status, see 
generally Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Note, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck—Regulating Away Alien 
Eligibility for Adjustment of Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and Sound Immigration 
Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV 713, 718–20 (2006).  
 47. An alien who is not admitted is deemed an ―applicant for admission.‖ 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(a)(1) (2006).  
 48.  ―An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives 
in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is 
inadmissible.‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i). However, no alien will be returned to his country of 
origin if the United States does not have ―full diplomatic relations‖ with that country. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(F).  
 49. Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds sub 
nom Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
7
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Cubans means something quite unique because the CAA gives the 
Attorney General the discretion to award permanent residency to any 
Cuban who is paroled into and physically present for one year in the United 
States.
50
 It is perhaps disingenuous to say that the Attorney General ―has 
discretion‖ because, in fact, ―[m]ost of the undocumented Cubans who 
arrive in the United States are allowed to stay and adjust to permanent 
resident status under the [CAA].‖51 Therefore, once stateside, Cubans 
typically remain in the United States permanently.  
In practice, a Cuban entering the United States is ordinarily inspected 
and paroled within the same day.
52
 Thereafter, the Cuban will enjoy the 
majority of benefits reserved for citizens, including permission to work 
within the United States and access to government-provided healthcare.
53
 
After two years of residence in the United States, the Cuban may apply for 
an adjustment of status to that of permanent residence.
54
 This is a privilege 
afforded to no other nationality and has been understood ―by generations of 
Cuban-Americans and many politicians to be an open-ended entitlement 
[to permanent residence] for all Cubans . . . .‖55  
B.  The Mariel Boatlift and the Joint Communiqué of 1994 
During the late 1970s, Cubans desperate to leave the island began 
hijacking boats in order to make landfall in Florida where they would 
                                                                                                                     
 50. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)). The Act reads: 
That notwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who 
has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to 
January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the United States for at least 
[one year], may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under 
such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the 
alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States 
for permanent residence. 
Id.  
 51. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: 
POLICY & TRENDS 2 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40566.pdf.  
 52. Telephone interview with the Honorable Keith Williams, retired Immigration Judge (Nov. 
3, 2010). If a Cuban alien is deemed inadmissible, typically because of a criminal record, the alien 
is given a ―supervisory order‖ and paroled into the United States just the same. Id. This is because 
the United States has no diplomatic relationship with Cuba. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(F).  
 53. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Keith Williams, supra note 52; see also WASEM, 
supra note 51, at 6–8. 
 54. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255n (2006)).  
 55. Note, supra note 22, at 907 (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted). See 
generally id. at 907 (noting that Cubans who ―arrived on American soil [were] in effect guaranteed 
permanent-resident status‖). 
8
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immediately be paroled into the United States.
56
 Following the hijackings, 
there were several attempts by asylum-seeking Cubans to force their way 
into Latin American embassies. In March of 1980, six frustrated Cubans 
drove a bus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, Cuba.
57
 
When this public unrest finally threatened the stability of the Cuban 
government, Castro used immigration to rid the island of malcontents and 
simultaneously wage war with Washington.
58
  
Castro felt that the United States government encouraged such political 
dissention with an open immigration policy and its failure to publicly 
admonish the dissidents for their illegal acts.
59
 He responded by sending 
the United States all the Cubans it could handle. On his orders, the Cuban 
government opened the port of Mariel, and Castro invited his exiles to 
return for their relatives.
60
 Between April 1980 and October 1980, nearly 
125,000 Cubans were picked up on the shores of Cuba and brought by boat 
to the United States in what became known as the ―Mariel Boatlift.‖61 The 
Carter administration welcomed this ―Freedom Flotilla‖62 to America with 
―open hearts and open arms.‖63  
If Castro thought he could rid himself of the troublemakers in one mass 
exodus, he was much mistaken. In 1994, food shortages, electrical 
blackouts, and government attempts to stop defection led to massive anti-
Castro demonstrations.
64
 Castro allayed the rioters this time by allowing 
those who wanted to leave Cuba to do so freely, with no threat of 
interdiction by Cuban authorities or ―illegal exit‖ penalties.65 
Approximately 25,000 refugees left the shores of Cuba in the summer of 
1994, many floating away on makeshift rafts.
66
 But unlike the Mariel 
Cubans, these migrants were not embraced with President Carter‘s open 
arms—they were instead pushed away by the Clinton administration.67 On 
August 18, 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced from the White 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See LARS SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC: THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 354 (2009).  
 57. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 55. 
 58. Id. at 54. 
 59. SCHOULTZ, supra note 56, at 354 (―The United States ‗encourages illegal departures from 
Cuba, the hijacking of boats, and it receives the hijackers almost as if they were heroes‘ . . . .‖ 
(quoting Fidel Castro)).  
 60. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 46. 
 61. Id. During this period, the Coast Guard rescued 124,776 Cuban refugees at sea and 
brought them into the United States. Mariel Boatlift, U.S. COAST GUARD, 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/mariel.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).  
 62. The participants of the Mariel Boatlift were often described as the ―Freedom Flotilla.‖ See 
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring).  
 63. FELIX ROBERTO MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED EXILES TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 83 
(1996) (quoting President Jimmy Carter).  
 64. Donald Brown, Comment, Crooked Straits: Maritime Smuggling of Humans from Cuba 
to the United States, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2002).  
 65. Talamo, supra note 40, at 713.  
 66. Note, supra note 22, at 907.  
 67. Id.  
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House press room that new measures would be taken to stop the rafters.
68
 
Without exception, the Coast Guard would collect immigrants found at sea 
and deliver them to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
69
 It was important that 
the Cubans not reach United States soil where they would be entitled to the 
protection of the CAA.
70
  
This was because the Clinton Administration, tired of being bombarded 
with Castro‘s castoffs, refused to take in more Cubans.71 Castro could not 
have been happier. For years, Castro had urged the United States 
government to repeal the CAA, insisting that the Act was a ―murderous‖ 
and ―terrorist‖ law.72 In September 1994, Clinton and Castro came together 
                                                                                                                     
 68. ROBERTO SURO, STRANGERS AMONG US: HOW LATINO IMMIGRATION IS TRANSFORMING 
AMERICA 27 (1998). President Bill Clinton met with a delegation of Cuban-American leaders to 
persuade them to endorse his new internment policy. Id. at 172. Clinton worried about mass 
demonstrations or interference with Coast Guard actions from Miami Cubans. Id. at 173. Among 
the group was Jorge Mas Canosa, leader of the Cuban-American Foundation. Mas Canosa gave his 
blessing to the policy, effectively approving the end of thirty-five years of preferential treatment for 
Cubans. Id. In fact, Miami Cubans as a whole barely objected at all. Id.  
 69. Talamo, supra note 40, at 713.  
 70. The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is not United States territory. See Cuban Am. Bar 
Ass‘n. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424–25 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing the status of 
Guantanamo Bay).  
 71. In a speech on June 27, 1995, President Clinton declared: 
We simply cannot admit all Cubans who seek to come here. We cannot let people 
risk their lives on open seas in unseaworthy rafts. . . .  
. . . . 
Regularizing Cuban migration also helps our efforts to promote a peaceful 
transition to democracy on the island. For too long, Castro has used the threats of 
uncontrolled migration to distract us from this fundamental objective. With the 
steps I have taken, we are now able to devote ourselves fully to our real, long-term 
goal. 
William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Remarks to the Cuban-American Community (June 27, 1995), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=51547&st=&st1=#axzz1Lsormmak.  
 72. Fidel Castro, Address at Mass Rally in the ―José Martí‖ Anti-Imperialist Square, City of 
Havana 12 (Nov. 27, 2001) (transcript available in the University of Florida Library West). 
Responding to the death of thirty Cubans attempting to immigrate to the United States via a 
smuggler‘s fast-boat, Castro told his ―compatriots‖: 
For many years we have been advising the U.S. Administrations that the 
Cuban Adjustment Act, in force since November 2, 1966, and the incentives to 
illegal migration are the cause of great hazards and take a high toll in human lives.  
. . . . 
The Cuban Adjustment Act is not only a murderous law but it is also a 
terrorist law, one that fosters the worst kind of terrorism since it deliberately and 
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to carve out an exception to the CAA in a bilateral migration agreement 
dubbed the Joint Communiqué.
73
 The Joint Communiqué states that Cuban 
―migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter the United States will not be 
permitted to enter the United States . . . .‖74 This language has become 
known as the ―Wet Foot/Dry Foot‖ policy, so coined because the policy 
rewards those Cuban refugees who reach American soil (those with ―dry 
feet‖) with adjustment under the CAA but calls for the repatriation of those 
interdicted at sea (those with ―wet feet‖).75 In effect, the Wet Foot/Dry 
Foot policy circumvents the deliverance of the CAA by preventing would-
be applicants who do not reach United States soil from completing the first 
requirement: to be inspected and paroled into the United States.
76
 
C.  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act & the 
Meissner Memorandum 
The Clinton Administration went even further to alter migration policy. 
In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRA).
77
 Under IIRA, ―An alien present 
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in 
the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the 
Attorney General, is inadmissible.‖78 The Act created confusion among 
immigration officials as to whether Cubans entering the United States at a 
place other than a designated port (as was often the case) were 
―inadmissible‖ and therefore, not entitled to an adjustment of status under 
the CAA.
79
 Many speculated that IIRA amounted to President Clinton‘s de 
facto repeal of the CAA.  
 Doris Meissner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
Commissioner, was not prepared to let the CAA fall by the wayside. In 
April 1999, Meissner issued a memorandum clarifying eligibility for 
permanent residence under the CAA despite having arrived at a place other 
than a designated port.
80
 The memorandum reads, in pertinent part: 
 
                                                                                                                     
remorselessly kills innocent children.  
Id. at 2, 12.  
 73. Joint Communiqué, supra note 34, at 329. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Note, supra note 22, at 907. 
 76. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)).  
 77. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).  
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006).  
 79. Talamo, supra note 40, at 718.  
 80. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm‘r, Eligibility for Permanent Residence 
Despite Having Arrived at a Place Other than a Designated Port (Apr. 19, 1999), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-26005/0-0-0-31369.html 
[hereinafter Meissner Memorandum]. 
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The policy of the [INS] is that the inadmissibility ground 
that is based on an alien‘s having arrived at a place other than 
a port of entry does not apply to CAA applicants. All [INS] 
officers adjudicating CAA applications will do so in 
accordance with this policy. So long as the applicant meets all 
other CAA eligibility requirements, it is contrary to this 
policy to find the alien ineligible for CAA adjustment on the 
basis of the alien‘s having arrived in the United States at a 
place other than a designated port of entry.
81
 
In her memorandum, Meissner indicated that a finding of 
inadmissibility would be contrary to legislative intent and noted that the 
United States government had in fact ―recently reaffirmed the availability 
of this adjustment provision, by enacting that the CAA is to continue in 
force until there is a democratic government in Cuba.‖82 Indeed, the 
privileges of the CAA remain intact today.  
IV.  SMUGGLING AN ILLEGAL ALIEN 
Despite travel restrictions imposed by both the Cuban and United 
States governments, Cuba is one of the top five ―immigrant-sending‖ 
countries.
83
 Immigration has increased since 1995.
84
 In fiscal year 2008 
alone, nearly 50,000 Cubans became legal permanent residents of the 
United States.
85
 Currently, Cuban nationals may legally migrate to the 
United States through (1) the issuance of an immigrant visa; (2) admission 
as a political refugee; (3) winning the diversity lottery; or (4) selection 
through the Special Cuban Migration Program, generally known as the 
Cuban lottery.
86
 For those who will not wait their turn, there is yet another 
way to the United States: a clandestine boat ride through the Florida 
Straits.  
The immediacy of the CAA continues to lure Cubans to the coast of 
Florida.
87
 And because current United States policy requires ―dry feet‖ for 
a shot at the good life, smuggling
88
 has emerged as the only feasible 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 606(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-695).  
 83. WASEM, supra note 51, at 15. The other top five countries in 2008 were Mexico, China, 
India, and the Philippines. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 9.  
 86. Fact Sheet: The Cuban Adjustment Act, U.S. DEP‘T. OF STATE (Mar. 16, 2000), 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/cuba_adjustment_act.html. For a more thorough 
discussion of legal methods of migration, see id.  
 87. For current statistics on the rate of Cuban migrant interdiction at sea, see United States 
Coast Guard‘s Web site. Alien Migrant Interdiction Statistics, U.S. COAST GUARD, 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/FY.asp (last updated Apr. 5, 2011).  
 88. The Eleventh Circuit defines smuggling as ―‗bringing into or tak[ing] out of a country 
[]merchandise, forbidden articles, or persons contrary to law and with a fraudulent intent . . . .‘‖ 
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1277 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting WEBSTER‘S 
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method of migration for many.
89
 To illuminate, 13,019 Cubans arrived at 
ports of entry without documents in fiscal year 2007.
90
 The Coast Guard 
was able to intercept another 2,868 Cubans before they reached land.
91
 An 
untold number entered the country at a place other than a designated port 
of entry. Immigration policy specialist Ruth Wasem has observed that of 
the 49,000 Cubans who became legal United States residents in 2008, 
―very few . . . arrived in the United States through the legal immigration 
avenues proscribed by the [Immigration and Nationality Act].‖92 
A.  Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy Incentivizes Smuggling 
A survey of recent case law demonstrates the technicality of current 
policy and the practicality in employing the assistance of a professional 
smuggler to enter the United States with truly ―dry feet.‖ For example, as 
noted by Javier Talamo in 1999, the Miami Herald reported that the Coast 
Guard apprehended three Cuban refugees in Key Largo, Florida, but only 
one was permitted to stay in the country.
93
 This is because of the three, 
only one Cuban landed on the beach.
94
 The other two were taken into 
custody while walking in the surf some 100 yards off shore.
95
 Technically, 
they were each standing on United States soil, but the two with ―wet feet‖ 
were prevented from coming ashore.
96
 The reporter interviewed an INS 
spokesman who defended the decision to repatriate the ―wet foot‖ Cubans 
stating, ―‗Everybody knows you have to make landfall,‘ . . . . ‗There are 
unique circumstances around every landing. . . The strict interpretation of 
the wet-foot policy is that other alien was still in the water. The 
interpretation found that one had made landfall.‘‖97 
Later, in February 2004, eleven Cuban nationals were discovered 
floating on the sea in a makeshift raft fashioned from a 1959 Buick 
automobile.
98
 The migrants boarded a Coast Guard vessel while 
approximately twenty-five miles offshore of Vaca Key, Marathon, 
Florida.
99
 While the passengers were interviewed as to whether they could 
establish a credible fear of persecution in Cuba, the vessel came within 
                                                                                                                     
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2153 (1966)).  
 89. See generally Brown, supra note 64, at 278–80 (discussing the rise in the professional 
smuggling of Cubans.)  
 90. WASEM, supra note 51, at 11.  
 91. Id. at 9.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Talamo, supra note 40, at 717 (citing Yves Colon, Touching Land Defines Who Stays, 
Goes, MIAMI HERALD, June 30, 1999, at 15A). 
 94. Colon, supra note 93. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. There are reports of the Coast Guard using pepper spray and even water cannons to 
prevent Cubans from making landfall. WASEM, supra note 51, at 16.  
 97. Colon, supra note 93 (quoting Dan Geoghegan, Assistant Chief of Border Patrol in 
Miami).  
 98. Rodriguez v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2004).  
 99. Id. at 1243.  
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twelve nautical miles of the United States coastline three separate times.
100
 
Three of the passengers were able to establish a credible fear of persecution 
and were scheduled for a transfer to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to 
undergo a detailed examination.
101
 Aware of the ―discrepancy in the 
percentage of petitions for asylum that are granted for interdicted 
passengers compared with the percentage granted for those who have 
successfully reached United States soil,‖ the Cubans sought judicial review 
of their repatriation while still onboard a Coast Guard vessel in 
international waters.
102
 They based their request for an injunction, inter 
alia, on the fact that they entered United States territorial waters three 
times aboard the Coast Guard vessel.
103
 However, the court found that 
―mere entry into United States waters‖ was not sufficient ―to accord the 
status of applicant for admission‖ and denied the Cubans‘ request for 
injunction.
104
 
 More recently, in 2006, the Coast Guard discovered fifteen Cuban 
migrants on the old Seven Mile Bridge in the Florida Keys.
105
 Originally 
built in 1912, the bridge was dilapidated and completely unconnected to 
land in some places.
106
 The migrants landed on such an unconnected 
portion.
107
 The Coast Guard deemed the bridge ―analogous to a buoy 
moored to the bottom of a channel by chain,‖ and therefore reasoned that 
the Cubans were not on United States soil and were ―feet wet.‖108 Under 
Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy,
109
 all fifteen Cubans were immediately returned 
to Cuba.
110
 
 Those who make the treacherous journey across the Florida Straits just 
to fail so close to the finish line serve as a lesson to all. Today, more and 
more Cubans (or their exile families) are willing to pay upwards of 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1244.  
 102. Id. at 1243–44.  
 103. Id. at 1244.  
 104. Id. at 1245–46 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 105. Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Chertoff, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2006).  
 106. Id. at 1348.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. The court noted that the Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy entitles Cubans to remain in the 
United States just by virtue of setting foot on shore. ―If [Cubans] reach land, they are allowed to 
stay, apply for political asylum and eventually residency. If they are picked up at sea, they are 
repatriated to Cuba.‖ Id. at 1344–45.  
 110. Id. at 1345. Back in Cuba, all fifteen migrants filed suit ―seeking (1) a declaratory 
judgment for a ‗Judicial definition of the term ‗territory‘ of the United States‘ including whether a 
bridge or structure equals presence within the United States, and (2) a declaratory judgment 
ordering the return to the United States of the fifteen individuals who were erroneously returned to 
Cuba on January 9, 2006.‖ Id. The court denied the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the Coast Guard‘s determination and subsequent repatriation was ―unreasonable‖ and 
that ―the migrants should have been considered ‗feet dry.‘‖ Id. at 1349–50. Despite the favorable 
ruling, the migrants, now back under Cuban jurisdiction, would not be permitted to leave the island 
legally. Id. at 1345.   
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/6
2011] IRRECONCILABLE REGULATIONS 1027 
 
$15,000 to be securely placed on United States soil by smugglers.
111
 It is a 
small price to pay for access to the American dream.  
B.  The Smuggling Statutes—A Congressional Conundrum 
 The existence of the CAA creates quite the legal quagmire. Congress 
has bestowed upon Cuban immigrants the unparalleled right to enter and 
remain in the United States.
112
 But Congress curiously criminalizes the act 
of bringing them here.
113
 Specifically, any person who: 
Knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to 
bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever such 
person at a place other than a designated port of entry or place 
other than as designated by the Commissioner, regardless of 
whether such alien has received prior official authorization to 
come to, enter, or reside in the United States and regardless of 
any future official action which may be taken with respect to 
such alien [commits a felony offense.]
114
  
Similarly, a person commits a misdemeanor who,  
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien 
has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, 
or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to 
the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien, 
regardless of any official action which may later be taken with 
respect to such alien.
115
 
 The smuggling statutes and the CAA stand in conflict. In practice, the 
contradiction of the two policies creates absurd results. Under the current 
law, Cubans are welcomed into the country while the boat captains go 
straight to jail.
116
 The outcome is hardly logical. Consider the case of 
Miguel Perez (Perez).
117
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Knaub, supra note 1. 
 112. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)). 
 113. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 114. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i).  
 115. Id. § 1324(a)(2).  
 116. Following the Mariel Boatlifts, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed indictments against 336 
defendants for substantive violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324, holding that the defendants lacked the 
requisite general intent of the smuggling statute and finding ―[n]otably, the defendants in this case 
are not the aliens, but rather those owners, captains, and crew members responsible for transporting 
the Cuban nationals to the United States.‖ United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1274 
(11th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussed 
more fully infra).  
 117. Perez, 443 F.3d at 774–75.  
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V.  PROSECUTION UNDER THE SMUGGLING STATUTE 
In July of 2004, Perez and his fishing buddy Juan-Carlos Valdez 
happened upon a stalled boat off the coast of Miami.
118
 The frightened 
passengers hailed Perez and told him that their boat was experiencing 
engine problems.
119
 As explanation, they told Perez that they too were on a 
fishing trip and lived in Miami.
120
 Then, they asked if he would take them 
to shore—just ―to leave [them] on land.‖121  
 Two hours later, when Perez docked his boat at Matheson Hammock 
Marina in Miami-Dade County, he and Valdez caught the attention of a 
Miami-Dade police officer.
122
 The officer requested to inspect the boat 
registration.
123
 When Perez opened the cabin to retrieve the registration, 
the officer spotted the six passengers that Perez had rescued earlier that 
day.
124
 Perez and Valdez were each charged with six counts of bringing 
aliens into the United States illegally
125
 and one count each of conspiring 
to bring aliens into the United States illegally.
126
  
 Because the officer discovered the Cuban nationals on United States 
soil, they were able to avail themselves of the CAA, be paroled into the 
country, and were eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status by 
July of 2005.
127
 In fact, during Perez‘s trial, the government presented the 
testimony of Yamisleidy Estevez-Galindo, one of the six Cuban nationals 
Perez recovered from the stalled boat.
128
 She testified that she had first 
traveled to the Bahamas from Cuba in order to arrange passage to the 
United States by boat.
129
 When the hired smuggling boat broke down, she 
and her fellow nationals were able to convince Perez and Valdez to allow 
them aboard the fishing boat and bring them ashore.
130
 Estevez-Galindo 
even admitted to carrying her mother‘s Florida driver‘s license, to offer as 
proof that she resided in Miami.
131
 Despite her illegal actions (and the fact 
that she tricked Perez into bringing her ashore), Estevez-Galindo was free 
to go, and Perez was convicted on all counts.
132
 It is a ludicrous result.
133
  
                                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 776. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 775.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 774; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 126. Perez, 443 F.3d at 774; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).  
 127. Perez, 443 F.3d at 775. 
 128. Id. at 776.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 774.  
 133. In fact, the Perez conviction for recklessly disregarding the aliens‘ immigration status 
mirrors the ludicrous result Judge Peter Fay envisioned in United States v. Zayas-Morales, where 
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a conviction under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
required a general criminal intent showing.  
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 Suppose instead that Perez did know that the stranded Cubans were 
trying to make their way to the United States to take advantage of the 
CAA. However, he mistakenly thought that current policy renders Cubans 
de facto legal immigrants by virtue of stepping onto United States soil and 
understood Cubans, and Cubans alone, to be authorized to seek asylum in 
the United States. This notion is entirely plausible and a rather common 
misconception amongst the Cuban-American community of South 
Florida.
134
 Because of the ambiguity created by the CAA and the Wet 
Foot/Dry Foot policy, the result of a trial with those facts would likely be 
just as ludicrous. Consider the possible defenses created by the confusion.  
A.  Actus Reus Defense 
There is no question that Perez brought a group of aliens to ―a place 
other than a designated port of entry or place other than as designated by 
the Commissioner‖ in violation of the felony smuggling statute.135 What is 
significant here is that the aliens are Cubans, and there is no designated 
port of entry for Cubans. In fact, the INS Commissioner has stipulated that 
essentially all places are valid entry ports for Cubans.
136
 According to the 
Meissner Memorandum, ―The policy of the [INS] is that the inadmissibility 
ground that is based on an alien‘s having arrived at a place other than a 
port of entry does not apply to CAA applicants.‖137 Quite simply, the rules 
are different for Cubans. Therefore, Perez could not commit the actus reus 
of smuggling a Cuban under 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A) because he did not 
bring them to an invalid port of entry. 
B.  Mens Rea Defense 
Suppose instead that Perez is charged under the misdemeanor 
statute.
138
 Arguably, his belief about the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot 
policy might negate the requisite mens rea of the crime. Perez certainly did 
not know that his passengers were not already United States residents. 
Rather, the government might argue that he acted with reckless disregard 
                                                                                                                     
Were we to hold that criminal intent is not required, anyone who might rescue an 
alien from the sea, bring them to our shores, and deliver them to immigration 
officials for proper processing would be subject to prosecution under this statute. 
We cannot conceive such an illogical application of this statute.  
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1277 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982).  
 134. See supra Part III.A. It is important to distinguish mistake of law from mistake of fact in 
this context. Where knowledge of the law is included as an element of the offense, it is a defense to 
that charge that the accused did not understand the law. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 
419, 425 & n.9 (1985) (finding that the statute in question required ―a showing that the defendant 
knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or regulations‖). This should not be confused with a 
mistake of law defense. Id. at 426 n.9. 
 135. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 136. See Meissner Memorandum, supra note 80.  
 137. Id.  
 138. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).  
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of the fact. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a person charged under 8 
U.S.C. § 1324 acts with reckless disregard if he is ―‗aware of, but 
consciously and carelessly ignore[s], facts and circumstances clearly 
indicating that the person transported was an alien who had entered or 
remained in the United States in violation of law.‘‖139  
In his defense, Perez offers the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy 
as evidence that he understood the policies to grant Cubans official 
authorization to legally enter and remain in the United States. What he is 
arguing is, in essence, a mistake of fact, and one that negates the requisite 
mens rea to convict him of the crime. If Perez‘s belief is correct, the 
Cubans have prior authorization to enter the country. If his belief is 
incorrect, the prosecution bears the burden of proving whether Perez acted 
with reckless disregard by considering the possibility that his 
understanding could be erroneous. Anything short of a flawless execution 
of this burden would leave the jury with reasonable doubt, enough for 
Perez to escape conviction.  
Certainly, the government will move to keep the jury from hearing 
about the policies, but a court is likely to let the evidence come in. This is 
because the evidence is highly relevant
140
 to the issue of whether Perez 
acted with ―reckless disregard of the fact that [the aliens had] not received 
prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United 
States . . . .‖141 The evidence is therefore admissible, subject, of course, to 
the court‘s discretion to exclude it should the court decide that either the 
prejudicial nature of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative 
value or that it will confuse the jury.
142
 In this case, the probative value is 
in demonstrating to the jury that Perez‘s subjective belief that the Cubans 
were here lawfully had some basis in the law and policy of the United 
States. A court is likely to find the evidence admissible because it is 
material to an enumerated element of the crime, and there is no other 
available evidence which might be offered in place of the policies. 
Ultimately, the overall probative value of the evidence cannot be 
outweighed by the chance that a jury might become confused as to when 
Cuban immigrants are ―legally present‖ in the United States. In fact, any 
potential confusion might be remedied with a limiting instruction.
143
 In all 
likelihood, the court would allow the evidence to be presented during trial.  
Once admitted, the evidence will likely be presented to a sympathetic 
jury.
144
 Alleged smugglers are typically tried in the jurisdiction in which 
they are arrested.
145
 Because most interdictions occur off the coast of 
Miami or the Florida Keys, smuggling trials occur almost exclusively in 
                                                                                                                     
 139. United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 781 (11th Cir. 2006) (external citation omitted).  
 140. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence ―means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence.‖ FED. R. EVID. 401.  
 141. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). 
 142. FED. R. EVID. 403.  
 143. FED. R. EVID. 105.  
 144. Brown, supra note 64, at 287–88. 
 145. Id. at 288. 
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South Florida, right in the heart of the Cuban exile community.
146
 A jury of 
the defendant‘s peers selected from this demographic is likely to be rather 
sympathetic.
147
 Once the jury hears about the policies, it will have an 
excellent excuse to find that the fisherman did not act in reckless disregard 
because he would not have considered that the conventional wisdom might 
be legally inaccurate.
148
 The policies are, after all, rather confusing, and 
presently, rather useless.  
C.  Intent: The Legislative History of the Smuggling Statute 
 The defenses created by the contradicting policies stand in 
contravention to congressional intent. The current misdemeanor smuggling 
statute originated in 1986 as a response to the ―Freedom Flotilla‖ that 
―carried more than 125,000 undocumented Cuban nationals to the United 
States and presented them to INS officials at Key West, Florida, so that the 
aliens could apply for political asylum.‖149 The government charged over 
three hundred boat owners and crew members with willfully or knowingly 
―‗bring[ing] into‘ the United States any alien ‗not duly admitted by an 
immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the 
United States.‘‖150 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
defendants did not possess the requisite mens rea because they never 
intended to commit an illegal act.
151
 
 Citing United States v. Zayas-Morales as the catalyst for the 
amendment, the House Judiciary Committee noted, ―Of crucial 
significance was the fact that the defendants in the case made no effort to 
land any undocumented Cubans surreptitiously or evasively, but instead 
brought them directly to immigration officers in Key West.‖152 This ruling 
opened the figurative floodgate for Cuban-Americans to retrieve their 
relatives from Cuba at will. Congress was unsettled by the implications and 
worried that, ―As happened during the Mariel episode, the United States 
would be forced to expend extraordinary amounts of money and human 
resources in processing, monitoring, caring for and giving hearings to 
exorbitant numbers of people.‖153 Recognizing that ―[w]ithout the threat of 
criminal prosecution, there is no effective way to deter potential 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 287. ―Prosecutors must also contend with issues over whether South Florida juries 
may be overly sympathetic to smugglers given the high level of criticism of the Government of 
Cuba expressed by the community at large.‖ Id.  
 148.  ―As part of its case, the government must prove the defendant conducted himself 
‗knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official 
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States.‘‖ United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 
772, 780 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)).  
 149. United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., 
concurring).  
 150. Id. (Korman, J., concurring) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976), amended by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)–(2) (1988)).  
 151. United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 1982).  
 152. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 66 (1986).  
 153. Id.  
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transporters from inundating U.S. ports of entry with undocumented 
aliens,‖154 Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), which criminalizes 
―conduct of the kind at issue in the Mariel ‗Freedom Flotilla‘ cases.‖155  
 Thus, it is clearly the intent of Congress to dissuade illegal Cuban 
migration. The American system simply cannot withstand another influx of 
Cuban immigrants. Yet current policy continues to incentivize smuggling 
by rewarding Cubans who make it to shore with a green card,
156
 despite the 
erosion of any justification for the policy‘s existence.  
VI.  HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND MODERN APPLICATIONS 
OF THE CAA 
A.  Historical Justifications of the CAA 
Congress enacted the CAA to accomplish four main objectives: (1) to 
destabilize the new Communist dictatorship in Florida‘s backyard; (2) to 
allow Castro‘s political refugees to enter America with minimal 
administrative burdens; (3) to expedite the rate at which new refugees 
could enter the American workforce; and (4) to allow Cuban refugees to 
apply for permanent residency from within the country.
157
  
1.  Cold War Objectives 
Castro‘s successful revolution left many ―fear[ing] that Cuba would 
undermine the U.S. cold war sphere of influence.‖158 As Soviet weapons 
and soldiers poured into Cuba, President John F. Kennedy warned, ―‗We 
shall not allow men whose hands are covered with blood from the streets 
of Budapest to teach us a lesson in noninterference. Communism in this 
hemisphere is not negotiable.‘‖159 The promised interference would be 
achieved through immigration policy.  
 By opening its doors to exile Cubans, the United States began a ―brain 
drain‖ of the Cuban labor force.160 The majority of initial immigrants were 
well educated and wealthy, among them physicians, professors, and 
engineers.
161
 The world saw the well-publicized ―departure from 
Communist Cuba to the democratic United States by refugees . . . [as] a 
vote against Communism and a vote for democracy.‖162 The United States 
government sought to foster this ―oppressive regime‖ propaganda to ―build 
the anti-Communist public sentiment necessary to support expensive Cold 
War programs.‖163  
                                                                                                                     
 154. Id.  
 155. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 619.  
 156.  ERLICH, supra note 5, at 64.  
 157. Note, supra note 22, at 908.  
 158.  Id. (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted). 
 159.  ERLICH, supra note 5, at 25 (quoting President Kennedy).  
 160. Note, supra note 22, at 909.  
 161.  Id. 
 162. Estevez, supra note 17, at 1280.  
 163. Note, supra note 22, at 909–10.  
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2.  Reducing Red Tape 
 Once the refugees arrived in the United States, they needed legal 
employment. The legislative history of the Act indicates that the CAA was 
a necessary device to facilitate the self-sufficiency of the exiles.
164
 Indeed, 
many of the Cubans arriving in the United States were well-educated and 
had the potential to contribute to American society.
165
 Congress reasoned 
that if those Cubans were permitted to become permanent residents, ―the 
talents and skills of many of the refugees, particularly in the professional 
field, which are now going to waste because of State licensing laws will be 
put to use in the national interest.‖166 
 The impediment to permanent residency at the time was an ―awkward 
procedure‖ that required applicants living in the United States to leave the 
country, apply for an immigrant visa at a United States Consular office 
abroad, and then return to the United States after approval as a permanent 
resident.
167
 Because the United States had terminated diplomatic relations 
with Cuba, Cuban refugees were obliged to travel to a third country to 
apply for their visas.
168
 In 1966, nearly 165,000 Cubans were living in the 
United States without permanent resident status.
169
 The CAA allowed 
those refugees to apply for an adjustment of status without leaving the 
country.  
B.  Modern Applications of the CAA 
1.  The National Security Loophole 
 One could hardly imagine that Cuba, with its devastated economy, 
continues to be a threat to United States security.
170
 Having been 
abandoned by Soviet troops in 1993, Cuba‘s Revolutionary Armed Forces 
is capable of only minimal military endeavors.
171
 In 1998, a Pentagon 
report emerged that concluded that the island ―does not pose a significant 
military threat to the United States or other countries in the region.‖172 In 
fact, the only threats that the Cuban government currently poses to 
American national security are the threats of illegal migration and drug 
trafficking,
173
 both of which might be remedied with a new immigration 
policy.  
 Of note, however, is the threat posed by foreign terrorists who enjoy 
                                                                                                                     
 164. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1978, at 4 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.A.N.N. 3792, 3794.  
 165. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 20.  
 166. S. REP. NO. 89-1675, at 4 (1966).  
 167. Estevez, supra note 17, at 1277.  
 168. Id. at 1277–78. 
 169. Id. at 1278. 
 170. Note, supra note 22, at 911–12.  
 171. Id. at 912.  
 172.  MELANIE M. ZIEGLER, U.S.-CUBAN COOPERATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 142 
(2007).  
 173. Id.  
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the support of the Cuban government.
174
 In 1982, Congress added Cuba to 
the State Department‘s list of states sponsoring international terrorism.175 
Cuba remains on that list today because many argue that there is ―ample 
evidence that Cuba supports terrorism,‖ including ―supporting terrorist acts 
and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa‖ and harboring 
―members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from 
justice.‖176 For example, Cuba openly shelters and supports the ―members 
of three terrorist organizations—Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Columbia‘s 
National Liberation Army (ELN).‖177  
 In a report issued in 2010, the State Department claimed that the 
―Cuban government . . . publicly condemned acts of terrorism by al-
Qa‘ida . . . ,‖ but admitted that Cuban officials ―remained critical of the 
U.S. approach to combating international terrorism.‖178 While there is no 
evidence that Cuba has been used to ―organize, finance, or execute terrorist 
acts against the United States,‖179 it is quite possible, most of all because of 
the CAA. A terrorist need only infiltrate—or be invited into—Cuba, obtain 
fraudulent Cuban identification, and then make his way to the United 
States where, under the CAA, he would be permitted to remain 
indefinitely.
180
  
 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States 
implemented new security measures that resulted in a significant drop in 
the processing and admission of Cuban nationals. Because of the 
difficulties in executing security clearances and background checks, only 
305 Cubans legally arrived stateside in 2003.
181
 Another 7,213 
circumvented the security measures by coming to the United States without 
documentation and thereafter invoking the CAA.
182
 Any one of those 
thousands of people could have been a terrorist claiming to be a Cuban 
refugee. The CAA creates a national security loophole that needs to be 
closed.  
                                                                                                                     
 174. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 39. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 40.  
 180. In describing the shortfalls of the CAA, Fidel Castro himself pointed out that: 
[T]hose who set foot on [American] coasts are automatically welcomed and not 
asked to meet any requirements. Individuals with tainted personal records, who 
would never receive a visa if they applied, then get the right to immediately start 
working and living in that country. Thus, the spirit and letter of the Migratory 
Agreements are breached and the assets and safety of Americans are placed in 
jeopardy. 
Fidel Castro, supra note 72, at 5.  
 181. WASEM, supra note 51, at 13.  
 182. Id. at 12 fig.3.  
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2.  Decline of Political Refugees 
 Gone too are the hordes of political refugees seeking asylum from 
Castro‘s regime. Between 1966 and 1973, an average of 38,000 Cubans 
entered the United States annually.
183
 From 1973–1979, those numbers fell 
to a mere 5,000 Cuban refugees per year.
184
 By the early 1970s, Congress 
came to realize that the emergency situation that prompted the enactment 
of the CAA ―no longer existed.‖185 In opposition to the continued 
American-funded airlift program, Senator Allen Ellender, Appropriations 
Committee chairman, argued, ―It is time to halt the program, not because 
we are against the Cubans, but because they ought to come through the 
regular channels. I really believe that we have done enough.‖186  
 When the Cuban government began to allow exiles back into the 
country in 1979, many Miami Cubans returned to their homeland with gifts 
for their relatives, symbols of ―the affluence available in the United 
States.‖187 As historian Melanie Ziegler speculates, it was perhaps this 
opening of the island that reminded Cubans of the ―American dream‖ and 
became the catalyst for the Mariel exodus of 1980.
188
 Within four months, 
over 125,000 Marielitos arrived in the United States through the Mariel 
Boatlift.
189
 In contrast to the first two waves of refugees, over 70% of the 
Mariel Cubans were ―blue-collar workers.‖190 These were not the same 
well-educated Cuban refugees who Congress sought to integrate into the 
American labor force.
191
 Many of them, and their successors, would 
become a burden to the American welfare system.
192
 Moreover, it was 
immediately apparent that the Marielitos did not come to the United States 
―to escape political persecution or to reunite with their families, but simply 
to try their luck in the land of opportunity.‖193 
 In fact, many of the Mariel Cubans were more criminal deviants than 
political dissidents. Castro seized upon the occasion to rid himself of 
―undesirables,‖ by opening up prisons and insane asylums so that the 
patients and prisoners could make it to a boat.
194
 Then-Miami Mayor 
                                                                                                                     
 183. ZIEGLER, supra note 172, at 45.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 45–46. 
 189. Id. at 48. 
 190. Id.  
 191.  See supra Part VI.A.2.  
 192. Note, supra note 22, at 914. Editorials published in the Miami Herald during the late 
1970s indicated America‘s frustration with the continuing onslaught of Cuban immigrants. GARCÍA, 
supra note 12, at 45. According to García, ―While the editors celebrated the rapid economic 
adjustment of the Cuban exiles—whom they called the ‗cream of the nation‘—they voiced the 
widespread concern that Cuba‘s cream had already been skimmed, and that the continuing influx of 
lower-class Cubans presented an economic burden to the United States.‖ Id. Forty percent of the 
Mariel Boatlift-era Cubans made less than $15,000 a year in 1990. SURO, supra note 68, at 172. 
 193. Note, supra note 22, at 912–13 (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted).  
 194. ERLICH, supra note 5, at 33.  
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Maurice Ferre wrote in a letter to the editor of the Miami Herald that the 
Cuban government had ―‗flushed these people on to us.‘‖195 The sentiment 
was not unfounded. Crime rose 66% in Miami in 1980.
196
 These 
undesirable ―refugees‖ released by Castro made a mockery of the CAA. 
The Marielitos could hardly be considered political refugees and neither 
can most current CAA applicants.  
3.  Immediacy of Immigrant Integration 
 Much of the red tape that existed at the time that Congress enacted the 
CAA is likewise no longer an issue. In 1966, there were over 165,000 
Cuban refugees living in the United States without permanent resident 
status and in need of legal documentation to obtain employment.
197
 Most 
of these refugees had no opportunity to obtain an immigrant visa before 
leaving Cuba.
198
 The current generation, however, is entitled to 20,000 
immigrant visas annually through the Joint Communiqué and may apply 
for the visa in person in Havana, Cuba.
199
 This system puts to rest any 
panic about integrating large numbers of invited Cubans into the United 
States.  
4.  Current State of U.S.-Cuban Relations 
 In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), which 
stipulates that the CAA will be repealed only when Cuba becomes a 
democracy.
200
 This is nothing more than an expression of excessive 
ideological idealism. Congressional decisions, especially those with 
international implications, ought to be pragmatic. Rather than preserving 
the CAA until a perfect political system comes about in Cuba, Congress 
should look to degrees of improvement within Cuba. Factors such as the 
independence of the judiciary, the softening of the administration, and the 
toleration of enterprise are just as indicative of progress as a transition to 
democracy.  
 Since the passing of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl 
Castro, Cuba has made significant changes. As Latin American Affairs 
specialist Mark Sullivan points out, in 2008 Cuba signed two United 
Nations human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights.
201
 In March of the same year, the Cuban government 
                                                                                                                     
 195. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 70 (quoting Maurice Ferre, Letter to the Editor, MIAMI 
HERALD, Apr. 2, 1983, at 16A).  
 196. Id. at 71.  
 197. See supra Part VI.A.2.  
 198. Note, supra note 22, at 913.  
 199. Joint Communiqué, supra note 34, at 330. 
 200. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1966 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, div. C, § 606(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-695 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 
18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 201. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 7.  
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began allowing Cubans to stay at tourist hotels.
202
 Just recently, the Cuban 
government began allowing the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco), a 
group of women who rally for the release of political prisoners, to conduct 
weekly demonstrations in Havana.
203
 On March 23, 2011, the Cuban 
government released the last two remaining imprisoned members of the 
―Group of 75,‖ a faction of democracy activists arrested in 2003.204 In fact, 
there has been a sharp decline in the number of political prisoners since 
2006 when Raúl Castro came to power.
205
 That year, there were 333 
prisoners, 283 by 2007, 205 in 2009, and 167 in July 2010.
206
 There are 
now reportedly only sixty political prisoners remaining.
207
 
 Just this March, Fidel Castro stepped down from his position as leader 
of the Cuban Communist Party.
208
 This momentous occurrence may signify 
the end of the Castro era. In further effort to cleanse the Cuban political 
system of the old guard, President Raúl Castro proposed in the same month 
that elected officials serve no more than two five-year terms.
209
 Blaming 
his generation for failing to cultivate young leaders, President Castro 
recognized the need for a ―‗systematic rejuvenation of the whole chain of 
party and administrative posts‘‖ during his opening speech at the Sixth 
Communist Party Congress.
210
 Days later, Fidel Castro endorsed his 
brother‘s speech, writing in the Cuban state-run newspaper Granma, ―‗The 
new generation is called upon to rectify and change without hesitation all 
that needs to be corrected and changed . . . .‘‖211 Also notable is the recent 
expansion of private enterprise. By late 2010, over 157,000 Cubans were 
self-employed and by early 2011, approximately 113,000 had received 
licenses to work independently.
212
 At the April Congress meeting, 
President Castro reported that his government had licensed 180,000 small 
businesses ―with tens of thousands more expected to be issued in the 
coming months.‖213 The New York Times heralded this progress as possibly 
                                                                                                                     
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 9.  
 204. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS 9–10 
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41617.pdf. During a crackdown in March 
2003 (a period sometimes referred to as Primavera Negra, or Black Spring), the Cuban government 
imprisoned seventy-five democracy activists, a group which included independent journalists, 
leaders of labor unions and opposition parties, and librarians. Id. at 9. The majority of the group 
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 205. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 10. 
 206. Id.  
 207. SULLIVAN, supra note 204, at 10. 
 208. Randal C. Archibold, Cuban Leader Proposes Term Limits in Sign of New Era, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/world/americas/17cuba.html.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. (quoting Raul Castro).  
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―the most significant changes [in Cuba] since businesses were nationalized 
in 1968 . . . .‖214 
 The Bush Administration indicated in May 2002 that Congress would 
consider lifting the embargo ―if Cuba was prepared to free political 
prisoners, respect human rights, permit the creation of independent 
organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward free and fair 
elections.‖215 It would seem that much of this has already occurred, and the 
time has come for the United States government to consider a moderated 
policy. Indeed, many argue that if the United States would alter current 
policy, ―then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would stimulate 
and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island.‖216 Sanctions 
against Cuba, which include an immigration policy designed to cripple the 
government, must give way in order for Cuba to effect change.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As Congress noted in 1971, the emergency that prompted the CAA is 
over.
217
 But rather than repeal the antiquated and gratuitous Act, the United 
States government sought to circumvent the windfall of the CAA by 
making access to its benefits contingent upon location. Thus, the Wet 
Foot/Dry Foot policy stands in contravention to the CAA. If Cubans are 
entitled to automatic political asylum, it is irrational that receipt of that 
asylum should be contingent on whether an applicant is standing on United 
States soil or on a Coast Guard vessel. The fact that Wet Foot/Dry Foot 
policy even exists demonstrates that the CAA is merely a Cold War vestige 
and no longer needed.   
―[T]he contradictions inherent in the ‗wet-foot, dry-foot policy‘‖ are 
directly responsible for the ―increase in human smuggling‖ cases since 
1995.
218
 Today, nearly all Cubans who enter the United States via boat are 
―doing so as part of human smuggling rings.‖219 Worse still, the confusing 
policies create defenses to the crime of smuggling a Cuban national that 
are in conflict with Congress‘ intent to stop illegal Cuban immigration. 
This is not news to Congress. In 2009, Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking 
member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, circulated a staff report 
suggesting an executive branch review of the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy.
220
 
According to the staff report, that ―review should assess whether [the] 
policy has led to the inefficient use of U.S. Coast Guard resources and 
assets as well as the potential to redirect these resources to drug 
interdiction efforts.‖221  
Despite awareness, no action has been taken. As the 1986 House 
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 215. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 22.  
 216. Id. at 18. 
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 218. Id. at 60.  
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Report warned, failure to deter migration will result in the United States 
being ―forced to expend extraordinary amounts of money and human 
resources in processing, monitoring, caring for and giving hearings to 
exorbitant numbers of people.‖222 Furthermore, the CAA results in a very 
real threat to national security by creating a loophole for terrorists to enter 
into and remain in the United States. To avoid these results, Congress 
should sunset the CAA and Cubans ―‗ought to come through the regular 
channels.‘‖223  
                                                                                                                     
 222. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at I (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.N.N 5649, 5670.  
 223. ZIEGLER, supra note 172, at 45.  
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